Skip to Content
Special Home > Guide to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New England Chapter Videotapes, 1987-2002

Guide to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New England Chapter Videotapes, 1987-2002

Collection number: VC 132

Size: 3 boxes
(1.00 cu.ft.)

About the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New England Chapter

The Association of Former Intelligence Officers New England Chapter, the David Atlee
Phillips Chapter, was formed in 1984.

About the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New England Chapter
Videotapes

The Association of Former Intelligence Officers New England Chapter Intelligence
Studies Collection consists of videotape recordings of meetings of the chapter,
primarily of program speakers or panels on Intelligence Studies topics. One tape
(#6) records a tour of London and World War II British Intelligence sites taken by
the chapter. Detailed descriptions are provided for each of the tapes.


Administrative Information

Access Restrictions

This collection is open.

Copyright Notice

Contents of this collection are governed by U.S. copyright law. For questions
about publication or reproduction rights, contact Special Collections staff.

Preferred Citation

[Identification of item], Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New
England Chapter Videotapes, 1987-2002, VC 132, Milne Special Collections and
Archives, University of New Hampshire Library, Durham, NH, USA.

Acquisitions Information

Donation: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New England Chapter, January 13, 1994 (Accession number: 94.003)


Collection Contents

Box 1
Box 1, Tape 1 Richard Schultz, “What is Intelligence?” (np: Symposium 10, Session
1, February 4, 1987, 3:00 pm). 78 minutes

Biography unavailable.

Summary: Schultz speaks of the four functions of intelligence: the collection
of information, counter-intelligence, covert action, and the analysis of
information. He examines these in light of three factors which lead
governments to approach these functions in different ways: the nature of the
political system, the specific situation or circumstances, and the nature of
the bureaucracy involved. He uses historical examples from the intelligence
community, and notes that all four functions are important and
interdependent. He remarks that aspects of these functions were severely
curtailed in the United States after disillusionment over Vietnam and
detente, but that over the last six years, the administration has attempted
to re-establish its capabilities, especially in covert action,
counter-intelligence, and human collection (spying).

Note: This tape begins in mid-sentence, and the speaker is in shadow
throughout.

Box 1, Tape 2 Stanislav Levchenko, “Two Systems in the Service of the Superpowers:
The CIA and the KGB” (np: Symposium 10, Session 1, February 4,
1987, 7:00 pm). 73 minutes

Biography: Levchenko graduated in 1964 from the Institute of Asia and Africa
of Moscow State University with a degree in Japanese language, literature,
and history. He pursued post-graduate study at the Institute of Oriental
Studies of the Academy of Science of the USSR, majoring in the modern
history of Japan. During the mid-1960′s, he served in several Soviet front
organizations of the International Department of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, where he became an authority on national liberation
movements and pro-Soviet organizations of the third world. In 1971, he
became a staff operations officer of the KGB Foreign Intelligence Service.
In 1975, he was sent to Japan under cover of a bureau chief of the Soviet
Magazine New Times. There, he gathered
political information and implemented large-scale Soviet covert action in
Japan and throughout the Far East. In 1979, he was promoted to the rank of
major in the KGB and became chief of the Covert Action Group in the Tokyo
office. In October of 1979, he asked the United States government for
political asylum.

Summary: Levchenko traces the history of the KGB, “the largest oppressive
mechanism in the history of the world.” He covers its basic organization and
tells why it has been so successful: its age provides it with institutional
memory; it recruits the best from a nation where foreign language is
important; it has an excellent training system; it is highly centralized,
efficient, and enormous with strongly motivated officers, all within a
system of strict military discipline.

Note: Apparently, this session included another speaker discussing the CIA,
but this material is not included on the tape.

Box 1, Tape 3 Angelo Codevilla and Steven Engelberg, “Covert Action and the
American Ethic” (np: Symposium 10, Session 2, March 12,
1987, 3:00 pm). 91 minutes

Biographies: Codevilla is a Hoover Institution Senior Research Fellow at
Stanford University, with a B.A. from Rutgers, M.A. from Notre Dame, and
Ph.D. from Claremont. After some time with the Foreign Service, he served
from 1977 (when the permanent House and Senate committees on Intelligence
were established) to 1985 as a senior staff member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. He left there to assume his position at Stanford. He
is the principal author of Intelligence Requirements of the 1980s and author
of Arms Control Delusion and While Others Build. He is a frequent
contributor to Commentary, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal.

Engelberg holds a B.A. in History from Princeton. Formerly the Washington
correspondent for the Dallas Morning News, he
had been with the Washington bureau of The New York
Times
for three years at the time of this symposium, with major
reporting on the Iran-Contra Affair and general matters of Intelligence.

Summary: Engelberg divides his discussion of covert action into three areas:
what it is, how it works, and a discussion of some of the moral issues that
relate to it. Though covert action is a small part of the CIA’s efforts,
both in budget and personnel, it is a basis of controversy, seemingly at
odds with the political culture in which it exists. He discusses
congressional oversight, the concept of prior restraint, and situations that
may require covert action.

Codevilla says the issue is not so much covertness per se as it is
substance–how the United States should deal with other nations. His main
discussion concerns political warfare, “the forceful political expression of
policy abroad”; a delineation of what its parameters should be; and the
ramifications of its abuse. He claims that “search and support for the
moderate faction has become the Holy Grail of American foreign policy,” and
that lack of effectiveness as well as abuse are based not just in
operational and political incompetence, but worse, in moral illiteracy.

Box 1, Tape 4 Arnaud de Borchgrave, “The Role of Disinformation” (np: Symposium 10,
Session 2, March 12, 1987, 7:00 pm). 87
minutes

Biography: De Borchgrave was editor and foreign correspondent for Newsweek for thirty years. After a stint at
Georgetown University, he became (in 1985) editor-in-chief of The Washington Times.

Summary: De Borchgrave mentions ways in which both the United States and the
Soviet Union have used disinformation. But the bulk of his discussion covers
the arena in which covert actions have been conducted by the government and
reported by the media in recent years. He says that owing to leaks from
congressional oversight committees and an unfriendly press eager to publish
sensitive material, the executive branch has become increasingly secretive
which can lead, and has led to abuse. The result is that no one of these
three players trusts the others. He feels it is unfortunate indeed that the
media have become players rather than observers in the game of international
politics and international relations. Further, foreign policy has
degenerated into a defensive and reactive operational basis. In the end, de
Borchgrave sees no purpose for disinformation in a democratic society,
where, he says, the most effective weapon is truth.

Box 1, Tape 5 Thomas Powers and Robert R. Simmons, “Intelligence in a Democratic
Society” (np: Symposium 10, Session 3, April 28, 1987,
7:00 pm). 108 minutes

Biographies: Powers took his B.A. at Yale, and has been a journalist and
writer for over twenty years, winning a Pulitzer Prize for Journalism in
1971. He is the author of four books, including The
Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA
, and over
200 magazine articles. He was working on a history of strategic weapons at
the time of this presentation.

Simmons was an operations officer for the CIA from 1969 to 1979, and staff
director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1981 to 1985.
At the time of this symposium, he was a major in the Army Reserves, and also
teaching a course at Yale involving Intelligence issues.

Summary: Powers discusses the conflict of secrecy and democracy in the United
States and the collision of values and goals that can result. Citing the
example of Nicaragua, he explains that the Reagan administration valued a
policy whose goal was the overthrow of the Sandanistas, while the public
valued the policy of informed consent with the goal of staying out of war.
In both Vietnam and Nicaragua, Powers says the government valued keeping
those countries from becoming allied with communism, but the conflict arose
because the public did not share that concern. The result was the
government’s decision to operate in secret. This should not be a basis for
secret operations.

Simmons bases his presentation on the public’s right to know versus the
government’s need for secrecy in developing intelligence networks. He
relates the background for the formation of the permanent congressional
committees on Intelligence, in 1976 and 1977, and oversight by the other
branches of government in regard to Intelligence: the President’s
Intelligence Oversight Board and the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in
the judiciary branch. These, in addition to the strong role the media plays,
form a strong basis for representative oversight on the public’s behalf,
and, he says, provide the public a form of accountability while maintaining
the necessary secrecy.

Box 1, Tape 6 J. David Reno, “The Spy’s Tour of World War II England” (London:
May, 1988). 122 minutes

Summary: This is an informal video record of a visit to England by the
Association of Former Intelligence Officers New England Chapter. Included
are a bus tour of London and visits to various sites connected with British
Intelligence activities of World War II, including a visit to Bletchley
Hall, site of the work on Ultra, the communications intelligence used by
Britain and the United States during that period. Several receptions and
interviews are also recorded.

Note: Since the approach is very informal, many of the sites and virtually
all the speakers are unidentified. The tape is copyrighted by the David
Atlee Phillips Chapter of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers.

Box 1, Tape 7 James McCargar, “My Career with the Foreign Service” (Kennebunkport,
ME: AFIO/NE Fifth Anniversary Meeting, June 10, 1989).
64 minutes

Biography: McCargar entered the Foreign Service in the last class before
World War II, with his initial assignment in Vladivostok. In 1944, he was
commissioned in Naval Intelligence and transferred to the Aleutian Islands.
He returned to the Foreign Service in 1946 and was assigned to the legation
in Budapest. Shortly after his arrival there, he became the Pond officer.
(The Pond was a secret intelligence service formed in World War II under the
orders of General George C. Marshall and under the direction of Colonel John
Brombeck. It operated in conjunction with the State Department, actually the
Foreign Service.) In late 1948, he moved to the Office of Policy
Coordination, another secret organization being formed in the CIA. He was in
charge of Southeast European affairs, including Albania. In 1955, having
left the Foreign Service, he became Director of Political Operations of the
Free Europe Committee, a position he held until 1958. In 1963, McCargar
related his experiences in a book, A Short Course in
the Secret War
, published under the name Christopher Felix. A
second edition was issued in 1988, with the true name of the author
revealed: Foreign Service Officer James McCargar. He has been called the
unsung hero of the Foreign Service.

Summary: In speaking of his career, McCargar covers the formation and
operation of such Intelligence organizations as the Pond, the CIA, the
Office of Policy Coordination, and the Free Europe Committee. He devotes
quite some time to his experiences with, and assessment of, Harold Adrian
Russell (Kim) Philby, the British Intelligence officer who disappeared from
Beirut in 1963, and subsequently fled to Moscow. He also gives his view of
the need, place, and value of covert political operations, now and in the
future.

Box 1, Tape 8 Richard Gillespie, “Richard Gillespie on China” (Stowe, VT:
October 28, 1989). 65 minutes

Biography: After graduating from West Point, Gillespie attended Yale, then
took his Ph.D. in Chinese Studies from American University. He studied
Chinese in the old language detachment on Taiwan, and was in the attache
system in Hong Kong before the United States became involved in Beijing. He
retired from the military system as Director of Foreign Intelligence on the
Army staff. After this first retirement, he became associated with the
US/China Business Council taking business people on tours of China. For his
last ten years there, he served as vice president of the organization. After
retiring again in August of 1989, he became a private consultant in the same
line of work.

Summary: Gillespie provides a background for the political developments in
China which led to a shift of the party from running business to running
government. This growing economic reform and development led to an open door
for business and warm relations in general until the Tiananmen Square
suppression of June 3-4, 1989. He speaks of the political, military, and
economic results of this incident, and the ramification of possible United
States sanctions, keeping in view the importance of continued relations with
China.

Box 1, Tape 9 Ed Bort, “The Intelligence Cycle” (Mystic, CT: February 24,
1990). 23 minutes

Summary: Bort discusses the intelligence cycle of direction, collection,
processing, and dissemination and use, along with the dilemma and suggested
solutions of the intelligence versus the operational components of military
operations.

Note: This is a fragment of a presentation, beginning and ending in
mid-sentence.

Box 1, Tape 10 Yossi Melman, “The History of Israeli Intelligence” (Mystic, CT:
February 24, 1990). 61 minutes

Biography: At the time of this speech, Melman was anticipating the American
publication of his book, Every Spy a Prince.
He served the requisite three years in the Israeli army in a reconnaissance
unit, where he received basic field tactical intelligence training.
Immediately after his military service, he studied Journalism at Hebrew
University in Jerusalem. In 1980, he was sent to London as a correspondent
for an Israeli daily newspaper and an Israeli radio station. While there, he
met and interviewed David Cornwall, author of fictional books on British
Intelligence. Cornwall, Melman says, introduced him to “the secret world of
intelligence and espionage.” At the time of this presentation, Melman was a
Nieman Fellow in Journalism at Harvard.

Summary: Melman speaks of Intelligence as a microcosm of society at large,
and says this is especially true of the Israeli intelligence community. Not
only does it manifest the traditional components of domestic security,
foreign espionage, and military intelligence, it also includes a component
that supports the immigration of Jews to Israel, and that also assists Jews
in peril, wherever they may be. Melman further illustrates his thesis with
examples of Israeli intelligence activities since the country’s inception in
1948.

Box 1, Tape 11 Mike Sandman, “The Growing Practice of Business Intelligence”
(Nichols College, Dudley, MA: June 12, 1993), 80
minutes
Box 2
Box 2, Tape 12 John Quinn, “Japanese Business Intelligence” (Nichols College,
Dudley, MA: June 12, 1993), 55 minutes

Summary: Two officers from the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. discuss
their role in supplying intelligence support for war games. Their office
handles about 50 war games per year, requiring them to provide expertise
over a wide range of political, economic, social issues affecting military
outcomes. The games are not an effort to actually defeat one country or
another; rather the process is paramount. The goal is to instill in military
planners ways of approaching contingencies. Examples of recent war game
scenarios included: Civil wars, evacuations under hostile conditions,
possible outbreak of hostilities in N.Korea, Iran and Iraq. Although
traditional war games were divided in “Blue” teams (U.S. and its allies) and
“Red” teams (the enemy), newer scenarios include “Greens,” other regional
actors who can influence outcomes. The war game support office functions in
conjunction with directives on the seven most prominent threats to U.S.
National Security: terrorism, evacuations, Bosnia, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance. The future of war-gaming would appear to lie
with computer simulations.

Box 2, Tape 13 Ronald Kessler, “The FBI” (Salem, MA: AFIO/NE Spring Meeting,
March 19, 1994), 51 minutes

Biography: Formerly a correspondent for The Washington Post and The Wall
Street Journal, Kessler is the author of numerous books dealing with
intelligence activities. His works include: Escape
from the CIA
, Moscow Station,
The Spy in the Russian Club, and Spy vs. Spy.

Summary: Kessler speaks in reference to his book, The
FBI: Inside the World’s Most Powerful Law Enforcement
Organization
, which examines the history and operations of that
organization. Although not the main focus of the book, it does contain some
accounts of abuses, excesses, and bunglings of the FBI. In reaction to that,
the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI office in Boston refused to allow an
agent to participate in this discussion, as requested by AFIO/NE. Kessler
briefly mentions the FBI under Hoover, and how it has changed under various
directors. He also touches on certain notable events such as the World Trade
Center bombing, the Yurchenko defection, and the Aldrich Ames case.

Note: This tape begins in mid-sentence and has lapses in the speech at the
beginning. Most of the tape consists of questions to the speaker.

Box 2, Tape 14 Nicholas Dawidoff, “Moe Berg” (Watch Hill, RI: AFIO/NE Fall Meeting,
November 5, 1994), — minutes
Box 2, Tape 15 Hank Flynn, “FBI Counter-intelligence on Pelton Case”; Jim Bamford, ”
” (Andover, MA: AFIO/NE Chapter Meeting, July 8, 1995),
— minutes
Box 2, Tape 16 Tim Weiner, et al. ” ” (Kennebunk Inn, Kennebunk ME: AFIO/NE Fall
Meeting, October 19, 1996), — minutes
Box 2, Tape 17 “The Intelligence Community.” Program 2 of the television series
Great Decisions, Foreign Policy Association, 1996

One of four programs on the tape whose total running time 108 minutes. This
is included on Tape 1 of 2 and is one of four programs on the tape whose
total running time is 108 minutes.

Box 2, Tape 19 Rupert Allason, “Venona”

Biography: Rupert Allason (whose pen name is Nigel West) is a military
historian and journalist specializing in intelligence matters. He has
researched books for a number of authors and is an acknowledged expert on
his subject. He has worked on several television programs, including the BBC
Spy! and Escape! series. He is the author of MI5:
1909-1945
(1981), A Matter of Trust: MI5
1945-1972
(1982), MI6: British Secret
Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945
(1983), Mole Hunt: Searching for Soviet Spies in MI5
(1987), Seven Spies Who Changed the World
(1991), Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain’s
Wartime Sabotage Organization
(1992), and The Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, MI6, and the War Whitehall
Nearly Lost
(1997). Allason was a British MP and continues to be
an avid student of intelligence issues surrounding WWII.

Summary: Contains discussion of the Venona Project. VENONA was the codename
used for the U.S. Signals Intelligence effort to collect and decrypt the
text of Soviet KGB and GRU messages from the 1940s. Allason contends that
the codebreaking triumph was essential to Allied success in WWII and
continued to give the Allies intelligence advantages during the Cold War. He
attributes the conviction of the Rosenbergs directly to intelligence derived
through Venona. Only very few were aware of Venona and its capabilities, and
that secrecy continued until just a few years ago. “Venona” was linked to
the “Enigma” and “Ultra” systems developed at Bletchley Park. The session is
one of AFIO’s most lively, and a most interesting Q & A period follows
Allason/West’s talk.

Note: The beginning of the tape is marred by tracking problems for
approximately the first 10 minutes (H. Bradford Westerfield’s introduction
and Allason’s introduction by a female AFIO member). The audio is
substandard throughout.

Box 2, Tape 20 John H. Waller, “Problems and Prospects of Intelligence Literature:
Making History Accurate, Objective and Alive.” (Durham, NH: AFIO/NE
Conference: “Teaching Intelligence Studies Today: The State of the Art in
New Hampshire,” June 29, 1999)

Biography: Waller is a former Inspector General of the CIA

Box 2, Tape 21 Douglas Wheeler, History Dept. University of New Hampshire. (Durham,
NH: AFIO/NE Conference: “Teaching Intelligence Studies Today: The State of
the Art in New Hampshire,” June 29, 1999)

Summary: Discusses teaching espionage and history over his 30 years at UNH.
He includes examples from his various courses.

Box 2, Tape 22 Thomas Trout, University of New Hampshire Political Science Dept.,
“Bad Intelligence or Bad Policy?: Teaching Students About the Role of
Intelligence.” (Durham, NH: AFIO/NE Conference: “Teaching Intelligence
Studies Today: The State of the Art in New Hampshire,” June 29,
1999)

Summary: Thomas Trout of University of New Hampshire’s Political Science
Dept. discusses “Bad Intelligence or Bad Policy?: Teaching Students About
the Role of Intelligence.” His talk is based both on his academic experience
and his experience as a military intelligence officer.

Note: The tape begins with a book presentation by Dan Halpin of Cloak and
Dagger Books to William Ross, Head of Milne Special Collections.

Box 3
Box 3, Tape 23 Ted Morgan, “Jay Lovestone and Intelligence Activities” (VT: AFIO/NE
July 1999), — minutes

Summary: Introduction by Burton Hersh, author of Old
Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA
. Author Ted
Morgan discusses his book on Jay Lovestone, the AFL-CIO senior official
charged with directing anti-communist activities. His contact in the CIA was
Mr. Wisner for over twenty years. The CIA funded Lovestone’s efforts to root
out communist influence in overseas labor organizations. References to his
work are found in Richard Bissell’s memoirs. In China he worked with Willis
Etter. He also had a relationship with the Dulles brothers. There is a
review of the James Angleton (CIA)-Lovestone alliance, referred to as a
“hidden power center.” Lovestone was eventually fired by William Colby,
Angleton’s successor. Lovestone was instrumental in bringing Solzenhitsyn to
the US. His papers are held by the Hoover Institute.

Box 3, Tape 24 (Kennebunkport, ME: AFIO/NE Fall Meeting, Oct. 30,
1999), — minutes
Box 3, Tape 25 Art Lindbergh, “Operation Lemonade”; Arthur Hulnick, “Private Sector
Spying: Dirty Tricks For Profit,” (Kennebunkport ME, Oct. 27,
2001)

Note: The tape begins at 7:44 minutes.

Box 3, Tape 26 Rev. Gordon Graham on Northern Ireland. Tape starts after
presentation has already begun. 57 minutes; Ted Gup, “The Book of Horror.”
The start of this presentation has tracking problems and audio is bad
throughout. — minutes. (Block Island, RI: AFIO/NE April
2002).
Box 3, Tape 27 M.G. Edmund Thompson, “Remote Viewing,” (Kennebunkport ME: AFIO/NE
Fall Meeting, Oct. 26, 2002)

Summary: “Remote Viewing” is a broad term for a variety of techniques or
protocols employed to produce and control extra-sensory perception (ESP).
These techniques were originally developed by researchers at Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) as part of a US-government-sponsored program that
ran from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. Thompson’s presentation